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KEVIN REUTER, AND GEORG BRUN
Abstract: Most philosophers have largely downplayed any relevance of multiple
meanings of the folk concept of truth in the empirical domain. However, confu-
sions aboutwhat truth is have surged in political and everyday discourse. In order
to resolve these confusions, we argue that we need amore accurate picture of how
the term ‘true’ is in fact used. Our experimental studies reveal that the use of ‘true’
shows substantial variance within the empirical domain, indicating that ‘true’ is
ambiguous between a correspondence and a coherence reading. We then explore
the consequences of these results for the project of re-engineering truth.
1. Introduction
Since populism gathered momentum, the term ‘true’ seems to be given away
so freely that the label ‘post-truth’ has become a commonplace diagnosis.1
Of course, many people try to put up resistance to this tendency, for exam-
ple, by building fact checker websites. But it appears that attempts at
curtailing the inflationary use of the term ‘true’ have largely failed. Many
others just continue to call statements ‘true’ sometimes even after acknowl-
edging that they do not correspond to facts in the world. A common reaction
is to call them liars (who intentionally tell falsehoods), bullshitters (who do
not care about the truth), or fools (who are too stupid to understand what
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they are talking about). However, we believe these reactions – although cer-
tainly appropriate in many cases – easily miss an important point.
Fact checkers do a great service to society: facts indeed matter a lot. But,
as we will argue in this paper, truth is often, especially in political and every-
day discourse, taken to be not just about facts, or correspondence with real-
ity. Other aspects –most importantly, coherence – play a crucial role as well.
Although this would be reason to think that ‘true’may be ambiguous in po-
litical and everyday discourse,2 the importance of coherence can be
overlooked if one is focused on statements that fall in the domain of the em-
pirical sciences, which are committed to a notion of truth for which corre-
spondence to reality is decisive.
Nonetheless, the idea that ‘true’ is ambiguous has long been with us. It is,
for example, clearly expressed in Tarski’s groundbreaking work on truth:
Theword ‘true,’ like otherwords fromour everyday language, is certainly not unambiguous. […]
We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but
with several different concepts which are denoted by one word. (Tarski, 1944, pp. 342, 355)
Tarski links this diagnosis of ambiguity to the various philosophical con-
ceptions of truth. Indeed, an important rival of the correspondence theory of
truth is the coherence theory which holds that a statement is true if and only
if it coheres with a specific set of other beliefs.Many seem to agree that in the
mathematical and ethical domain, the coherence theory seems well suited to
explain our practice of assigning truth.
In what follows, we present experimental studies which challenge the idea
that – within the empirical domain – the common-sense notion of truth is
rooted exclusively in correspondence. In these experiments, participants
read vignettes in which a person makes a statement that either corresponds
with reality but is incoherent with other relevant beliefs or fails to corre-
spond with reality but is coherent with other beliefs. Perhaps surprisingly
or even shockingly – at least from a philosopher’s perspective – a substantial
number of participants (in some experiments up to 70%) responded in line
with the predictions of the coherence account. These results suggest that,
even within the empirical domain, ‘true’ is not used in a uniform way in ev-
eryday discourse. Although it has been known since Næss’s first empirical
investigations and his exchange with Tarski (Næss, 1938; Tarski, 1944) that
such a result might be plausible, it has neither been corroborated in system-
atic empirical studies nor has it been taken serious enough by philosophers.
What is more, the ambiguity of ‘true’ in everyday discourse is not harm-
less, given the central role this notion plays in public and political discourse
– as witnessed by the recent ‘post-truth’ debate. Vital questions therefore
need to be asked about the way we want our concept of truth to be. In other
words, we need to determine whether and how truth needs to be re-
engineered.3 So far, this question has been discussed in the context of
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projects that aim at developing a formally rigorous account of truth
(Tarski, 1933, 1944) and at dealing with liar-style paradoxes (Scharp, 2013).
In contrast to these approaches, we focus on the use of ‘true’ in everyday and
public discourse. As we will argue, our empirical results give us strong rea-
sons to advocate re-engineering truth for these discourses. In no way, this
means that we would want to advocate gerrymandering the use of ‘true’ in
a way that could be seen as a legitimation for propagating coherentmisinfor-
mation, whitewashing lies and bullshit, or dismissing facts and fact checking.
Rather, we think that problematic aspects of using ‘true’ can and need be ad-
dressed on the basis of a more accurate picture of the everyday usage of
‘true’. More specifically, we will argue that everyday and public discourse
could be improved by new ways of deploying distinctions and theoretical
concepts philosophers have developed, that re-engineering truth requires to
employ at least two target concepts, and that work on coherence may be
much more pertinent than usually recognized.
In the next section, we briefly discuss how the debate about theories of
truth (Section 1) and previous empirical studies (Section 2) gives us reason
for thinking that ‘true’ may be ambiguous. Section 3 presents our experi-
mental studies which indicate that ‘true’may be ambiguous.We also discuss
the most pressing challenge, which seeks to explain away our findings with
the allegation that our studies do not properly distinguish truth from related
concepts like truthful and true for. In Section 4, we explore the consequences
of these results for the project of re-engineering truth.
2. Background to the potential ambiguity of ‘true’
The idea that ‘true’may be ambiguous has been advanced from two perspec-
tives. In Section 2.1, we briefly review how the debate about correspondence,
coherence, and pluralistic theories of truth speaks in favor of thinking that
‘true’ is ambiguous. Section 2.2 summarizes some previous empirical studies,
which also point in the direction of ambiguity.
2.1. CORRESPONDENCE, COHERENCE, AND PLURALISTIC THEORIES OF
TRUTH
At the core of the many versions of the correspondence theory is the idea
that only those statements are true whose content corresponds to reality: if
reality is such that the Earth is getting warmer, then ‘the Earth is heating
up’ is true; otherwise, it is false. The fact checkers mentioned above are
clearly within the camp of the correspondence theorists. And so are many
important historical figures since Greek antiquity, as well as about half of
the philosophers living today (see Bourget & Chalmers, 2014). Some version
of the correspondence theory is almost undoubtedly in place in the natural
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sciences. It is, of course, possible that the notion of truth that the sciences
employ diverges to some extent from the folk concept of truth. But without
evidence to the contrary, one might assume that striving for the truth is the
same endeavor whether you are engaging in a scientific exercise or in every-
day talk. This assumption is further supported by claims regarding the intu-
itive correctness of the correspondence account. However, such intuitions
loose some of their force whenwemove into other domains of discourse, like
mathematics or ethics, which brings us to the coherence account.
The coherence theory (e.g., Putnam, 1981; Young, 2001) claims that a
statement is true if and only if it coheres with a specific set of other state-
ments or beliefs. Accordingly, a statement such as ‘snow is white’ is true,
not because reality matches that content (although, of course, it still might
do so), but rather because it coheres with other statements like ‘On pictures
snow looks white’, ‘The reflective properties of snow are such-and-so’, and
‘If you put on tinted glasses, snow looks colored’. The coherence theory
seems to be an epistemically plausible position: when people are interested
in verifying or falsifying a certain belief, they will naturally consider whether
other beliefs cohere or rather stand in tension with it. One might object
though that we shall not confuse our epistemic practice of finding out the
truth with what makes true a certain statement. While this objection seems
to have some force in the empirical domain, it is less convincing in the math-
ematical or ethical domain. Not only dowe find out the truth of ‘11 is a prime
number’ by checking its coherence with other theorems in arithmetic, it
seems to many that this statement is made true by cohering with fundamen-
tal mathematical axioms. Thus, at least for some areas of discourse, intuition
seems to be on the coherentist side.
Not all philosophers argue for a monistic theory of truth. Pluralists about
truth hold that there is more than one way for a statement to be true. Given
the intuitions people have about truth in the various domains, it is not sur-
prising that most, if not all, pluralists are scope pluralists. Thus, Edwards
states that ‘the basic idea behind all forms of truth pluralism is that the anal-
ysis of truth may require different treatments for different kinds of subject
matter’ (Edwards, 2012). Correspondence theories seem more convincing
when applied to truths in the empirical domain. For example, ‘Water is
H2O’, and ‘Maria has got a Rolex watch in her safe’ – statements that seem
to be true in virtue of corresponding to reality. Coherence theories seem in-
tuitively plausible when accounting for truths in the legal, the ethical, or the
mathematical domain. For example, ‘11 is a prime number’, and
‘Manslaughter is a felony’ – statements that seem to be true in virtue of co-
hering with a mathematical system, a body of law, or an ethical code.
There seem to be three ways to resolve the debate between
correspondentists and coherentists – violently neglecting, of course, other ac-
counts of truth. First, one can argue that only one of the two accounts cap-
tures the meaning of the term ‘true’. Second, one can accept that ‘true’ is
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ambiguous and can express correspondence with reality, but also coherence
with a certain set of other beliefs. And third, some scope pluralists have tried
to cash out the meaning of ‘true’ by a set of basic platitudes that can account
for the seemingly different uses in the various domains of discourse (see
Wright, 2005, and Lynch, 2012). Crucially, one important factor in helping
to settle this debate has been largely neglected so far. While many scholars
concede that people’s intuitions about truth can be in line either with the cor-
respondence account or with the coherence account, we do not know so far
whether the concept of truth actually is ambiguous between different read-
ings in the empirical domain of discourse.
We have so far seen that both the everyday use of the term ‘true’ and phil-
osophical discussions on truth point towards a possible ambiguity of the folk
concept of truth. Before we present our own experiments, we would like to
draw on some previous empirical data that provide further reasons to take
the idea that truth is ambiguous even more seriously.
2.2. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON TRUTH
The history of empirical studies on the common-sense notion of truth is itself
quite remarkable and has been discussed recently in Barnard and
Ulatowski (2016). In the 1930s, ArneNæss (1938) conducted interviewswith
around 300 laypeople. He asked his subjects explicit questions like ‘what is
the common characteristic of what is true?’ Based on the highly variegated
responses, he claimed that empirical investigations reveal a plurality of
common-sense notions of truth, none of which dominates laypeople’s think-
ing. While Næss was certainly ahead of his time, asking laypeople to articu-
late their views about the concept of truth is highly problematic. For many
concepts that we possess, we are capable of using them appropriately and
without great effort. In contrast, correctly articulating the content of those
concepts is difficult and often leads to incorrect or confabulated responses.
Apart fromNæss’s later work (e.g., Næss, 1953a, 1953b), empirical inves-
tigations on the folk concept of truth were dormant for many decades. Only
very recently did Barnard,Ulatowski, andKölbel use empirical means to ex-
amine various aspects of our everyday concept of truth. In his 2008 paper
‘True’ as Ambiguous, Kölbel (2008) considers the two statements ‘Ali G is
very funny’ and ‘Statements concerning what is funny can’t be true or false’
and claims that it is quite plausible to consider both statements to be true.
Assenting to both statements need not be contradictory, as long as the term
‘true’ is interpreted deflationary in the first sentence and substantially in the
second. When, at the beginning of three of his philosophy courses, Kölbel
asked his students to fill-in a questionnaire, a substantial amount – one time
even a majority – considered ‘Ali G is funny’ to be true or false, but at the
same time also considered the sentence ‘Statements concerning what is
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funny cannot be true or false’ to be true. Unfortunately, Kölbel does not
present any numbers or statistics of the results of the survey.
Barnard andUlatowski have advanced our knowledge of the folk concept
of truth in a methodologically far more rigorous manner. They recruited
hundreds of lay people on the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk
and asked them various questions to examine the way the folk understand
truth. The collected data were subsequently subjected to statistical analysis.
In Barnard and Ulatowski (2013), participants were randomly assigned to
two different conditions. In the Anna condition, subjects read the sentence
‘Anna has performed a simple calculation and discovered that
30 + 55 = 85.’ In the Bruno condition, participants were presented with
the sentence ‘Bruno has just finished painting his house. Bruno painted his
house the same color as the sky on a clear summer day. Bruno claims his
house is blue.’ The participants were then asked to rate their agreement with
the statement ‘If a claim reports how the world is, then it is true’ on a scale
from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’). The results suggest that
when thinking about statements in different domains of discourse – mathe-
matical versus empirical – people will entertain a correspondence notion of
truth more strongly in the empirical domain (Mav = 3.63) compared with
the mathematical domain (Mav = 2.81).
4
Both approaches certainly have their virtues. We think it is best to follow
Kölbel’s approach in directly asking people whether they believe a certain
statement to be true or false. However, in order to examine more complex
questions like whether people’s concept of truth is more strongly influenced
by considerations of correspondence or coherence, we need to manipulate
those very aspects inside the vignettes and collect data on those responses
in the rigor exemplified by Barnard and Ulatowski. The design and the re-
sults of those studies will now be presented in the next section.
3. Experimental studies
Both advocates of the correspondence theory and the coherence theory
make falsifiable hypotheses about the common-sense notion of truth. We
do believe that the hypotheses we lay out below capture an important – per-
haps the most important – aspect of both theories. However, we do not com-
mit ourselves to the implausible claim that all proponents of either of the two
theories will adhere to one of those hypotheses. These are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 Correspondentism: Laypeople consider an empirical state-
ment S of Person P to be true or false depending on whether S corre-
sponds with reality, and regardless of S’s coherence with other relevant
beliefs of Person P.
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Hypothesis 2 Coherentism: Laypeople consider an empirical statement S
of Person P to be true or false depending on whether S coheres with other
relevant beliefs of Person P, and regardless of S’s correspondence with
reality.
We merely use the terms ‘correspondentism’ and ‘coherentism’ instead of
‘correspondence theory’ and ‘coherence theory’, to indicate the somewhat
restricted impact of our studies on theories of truth. For example, different
versions of the coherence theory require different sets of beliefs that need
to be coherent with a certain statement. While some have argued that the
critical set of beliefs are those upheld by an omniscient being, others have
settled for sets that encompass beliefs held by real people (Young, 2001).
The coherentism hypothesis ‘merely’ requires coherence with other relevant
beliefs of the person making the statement. We have chosen hypotheses that
try to encode crucial aspects of the correspondence and coherence theories,
but at the same time, allow for relatively straight-forward empirical
falsification.5 Now, if we design vignettes that pitch coherence against
non-correspondence on the one hand, and incoherence with correspondence
on the other, we can investigate empirically whether one of those two hy-
potheses about the folk concept of truth is supported by the data. Alterna-
tively, it might turn out that the concept of truth is ambiguous between a
coherentist and a correspondentist meaning. Hence, both meanings may
play a vital role in determining the truth of a statement.
Wenowpresent themethods and results of ourmain studies in Sections 3.1
and 3.2, before we address possible concerns and objections to our studies in
Section 3.3.
3.1. STUDY 1: COHERENCE WITHOUT CORRESPONDENCE
3.1.1. Methods
For Study 1, 100 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk
and paid a small fee for their participation. Nine participants were excluded
for indicating that they were not native English speakers. Of the remaining
91 participants, there were 50 women (and none indicating non-binary gen-
der) with an average age of Mage = 36.32 (SD = 11.84). Two different vi-
gnettes were designed to avoid an influence of the scenario as an artifact.
[Party] Anne andRobert go to a party late at night. On their way to the party, Anne asks Robert
whether any of his friends are at the party. Robert answers that Jill is at the party, because Jill
had told Robert a few hours before that she would go. When they arrive at the party, it turns
out that Jill had changed her plans, and actually is not at the party.
[Rolex] Maria is a watch collector. She keeps all her watches in a safe and knows her collection
really well. One day, her friend John asks her, whether she has a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her
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safe and, if so, could show it to her. Maria answers that she has got a 1990 Rolex Submariner in
her safe. After all, she had purchased that watch a few years ago. When Maria opens the safe a
little later, she finds out that a burglar has stolen several watches, among them the 1990 Rolex
Submariner. (Note: This scenario is a variation of a vignette used by Reuter & Brössel, 2018,
as well as Turri, 2013.)
In both scenarios, the main protagonist (Robert/Maria) gives an answer
that is coherent with other relevant beliefs at the time inwhich they are asked
the question.While Robert states that Jill is at the party because he had been
told by her (and he had no indication that she would change her mind),
Maria remembers correctly that she had purchased the Rolex watch and
did not know that someone had stolen it. At the same time, both answers
do not correspond to the way the world is at the time of their answer. Thus,
both scenarios encode a situation in which the answers are coherent with
other relevant beliefs but do not correspond with reality.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two scenarios. After
reading the vignette, they were asked the following question:
[Party] Was Robert’s answer true or false?
[Rolex] Was Maria’s answer true or false?
People were presented with three options: (1) true; (2) false; and (3) not
sure.6
Whereas a ‘true’ response suggests that the participant endorses
coherentism (at least for the scenario in question), a ‘false’ response is indic-
ative of correspondentism. This only holds, of course, if our design really
measures people’s views on truth, and not related aspects like truthfulness
or truth-for-ness. We will deal with those objections in Section 3.3.
3.1.2. Results
As Figure 1 shows, a majority of participants in both scenarios opted for the
‘true’ response, 59.6% in the Party case, and 56.8% in the Rolex case. A mi-
nority chose the ‘false’ response, and eight participants were ‘not sure’.
Pearson’s χ2 tests were used to investigate whether the results differed from
the 50% mark (leaving out the ‘not sure’ responses). If either the
correspondentism hypothesis or the coherentism hypothesis was true (see
above), we would (at a minimum) expect the collected data to reveal a signif-
icant deviation from the 50% mark towards a majority of one of the two re-
sponse options. However, neither in the Party case, χ2 = 1.10, p = 0.294, nor
in the Rolex case, χ2 = 2.39, p = 0.122, were the results significantly different
from the 50% mark.
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3.1.3. Discussion and follow-up study
Study 1 indicates that neither Hypothesis 1 (correspondentism) nor Hypoth-
esis 2 (coherentism) is well supported by the empirical data we collected. In-
stead, some laypeople seem to be largely guided by the coherence of
Maria’s/Robert’s answers with other relevant beliefs they hold. Other peo-
ple are likely to take the lack of correspondence with reality of
Maria’s/Robert’s answer to determine the falsity of their answer. It is also
worth noting that only very few participants opted for the ‘not sure’ answer,
suggesting that the vignette did not present a borderline case, which tells
against the vagueness of ‘true’ in this case.
It should be noted that our study only investigated whether people con-
sider Robert’s or Maria’s answer to be true. We have not inquired whether
people are also willing to assent to a statement like ‘it is true that Jill is at
the party’, independent of whether this statement was made by Robert.
We have refrained from doing so, because asking people whether they agree
with such a statement makes it no longer possible to pitch the coherentist
against the correspondentist prediction. When reading the story, the reader
is informed that Jill did not go to the party. Thus, the statement ‘Jill is at the
party’ is only coherent with Robert’s set of beliefs at the time in which he
makes the statement, but not coherent with the reader’s set of beliefs at the
time in which she reads the story. On the assumption that readers will assess
Figure 1. Responses in % to the scenarios of Study 1.
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‘it is true that Jill is at the party’ in relation to their own beliefs, the
coherentist prediction therefore coincides with the correspondentist
prediction.7
One might object, however, that we should have spelled out the proposi-
tional content that Jill is at the party, or that the Rolex watch is in the safe,
when we asked participants whether Maria’s/Robert’s answer was true or
false. We have, therefore, conducted a follow-up experiment in which we re-
ran the experiment described above. The only difference was that we speci-
fied the propositional content of the answer. Thus, we asked the
participants ‘Was Robert’s answer that Jill is at the party, true or false?’,
and, respectively, ‘Was Maria’s answer that she has got a 1990 Rolex Sub-
mariner in her safe, true or false?’A total of 100 participants (all English na-
tive speakers; 68 female, 32 male, and 0 non-binary; Mage = 33.55,
SD = 10.33) were recruited on Prolific and randomly assigned to either the
Party vignette or the Rolex vignette. The results were very similar to the
original study. In the Party case, 23 participants selected ‘true’, 24 ‘false’,
and 3 ‘not sure’. In the Rolex case, 32 participants selected ‘true’, 16 ‘false’,
and 2 ‘not sure’. The results were not significantly different from the 50%
mark (excluding ‘not sure’ responses) for either the Party case (χ2 = 0.04,
p = 0.837) or the Rolex case (χ2 = 2.74,p = 0.098). In other words, neither
of the two hypotheses is supported by the empirical data when the proposi-
tional content is made explicit in the truth question.
3.2. STUDY 2: CORRESPONDENCE WITHOUT COHERENCE
The purpose of Study 2 was to reverse the context of the scenarios of
Study 1 in regard to coherence and correspondence. In Study 1, the pro-
tagonists answer coherently with their set of beliefs, but their answers do
not correspond with the way the world turns out to be. In contrast, in
Study 2, we designed two scenarios that pitted incoherence against
correspondence.
3.2.1. Methods
We randomly assigned 100 participants that were recruited onAmazonMe-
chanical Turk to two different scenarios. Six participants were excluded for
not having finished the survey or because they were not native English
speakers. Of the remaining 94 participants, there were 50 women (and none
indicating non-binary gender) with an average age of Mage = 35.73
(SD = 12.93). The two scenarios read:
[Party] Anne and Robert go to a party late at night. On their way to the party, Anne asks Robert
whether any of his friends are at the party. Robert answers that Jill is at the party, although
Robert had been told by Jill a few hours before that she would not go – a piece of information
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thatRobert completely forgot in thatmoment.When they arrive at the party, it turns out that Jill
had changed her plans, and actually is at the party.
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[Rolex] Maria is a watch collector. She keeps all her watches in a safe and knows her collection
really well. One day, her friend John asks her, whether she has a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her
safe and, if so, could show it to her.Maria answers that she has not got a 1990Rolex Submariner
in her safe, despite the fact that Maria purchased that watch a few years ago – a piece of infor-
mation that Maria completely forgot in that moment. When Maria opens the safe a little later,
she finds out that a burglar has stolen several watches, among them the 1990 Rolex Submariner.
Each participant was presented with only a single vignette. After each sce-
nario, we asked the participants to answer the same question as in Study 1.
[Party] Was Robert’s answer true or false?
[Rolex] Was Maria’s answer true or false?
People were presented with three options: (1) true; (2) false; and (3) not
sure. This time, a ‘true’ response would suggest that the participant endorses
correspondentism, whereas a ‘false’ response is indicative of coherentism.
3.2.2. Results and discussion
The percentages of the responses are displayed in Figure 2. In Study 2, the
scenarios we used had an effect on people’s responses to the questions raised
in the vignettes. In the Party case, 65.2% claimed that Robert’s answer was
true, and 23.9% that the answer was false. In the Rolex case, the pattern was
almost reversed: 54.2% decided that Maria’s answer was false, and 35.4%
thatMaria’s answer was true. Pearson’s χ2 tests revealed that the two scenar-
ios were significantly different, both when the ‘not sure’ responses were in-
cluded (χ2 = 9.64,p = 0.008) and when they were excluded (χ2 = 9.64,
p = 0.002). We ran Pearson’s χ2 tests to find out whether the results for
‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses differed from the 50% mark (again, leaving out
the ‘not sure’ responses). In the Party case, χ2 = 4.20,p = 0.040, the outcome
was significantly different from the 50% mark. This was, however, not the
case in the Rolex scenario, χ2 = 0.75,p = 0.385.
While the data in Study 1 suggest a slightmajority for coherentist answers,
the data aremore complex to interpret in Study 2.Whereas in the Party case,
more people were inclined to give a response in line with the
correspondentist picture, a majority of the participants in the Rolex case
were favoring the coherentist picture. However, the responses are also simi-
lar to Study 1 in suggesting that neither of the two hypotheses –
correspondentism and coherentism – is supported by one of the two cases:
while there was a significant majority of correspondentist answers in the
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Party case, the Rolex case did not confirm this finding but rather reversed
the overall pattern of results. The variance in people’s responses indicates in-
stead that the term ‘true’might be ambiguous: while some people entertain a
correspondentist reading of ‘true’, others hold a coherentist conception, at
least in the cases we tested. Again, the number of ‘not sure’ answers was
fairly low.
3.3. STUDY 3: MEETING THE SUBSTITUTION OBJECTION
It seems that the results of Study 1 and Study 2 can be explained neither by
those advocating that a statement is true in virtue of coherence nor by those
in favor of the correspondence theory of truth. Instead, the data suggest that
both aspects, that is, coherence and correspondence with reality, play a role
when people judge a statement to be true or false in the empirical domain.
This seems particularly worrisome for correspondentists, as well as scope
pluralists arguing for a correspondence view in the empirical domain. After
all, it is these theorists who often claim that the correspondence theory cap-
tures the ordinary meaning of ‘true’ in the empirical domain.
Now, correspondentists are likely to make the following objection: the re-
sults only provide a challenge to the correspondence theory if the experi-
ments track the folk concept of truth. However, so the objection, our
experiments failed to investigate the concept of truth and instead prompted
Figure 2. Responses in % to the scenarios of Study 2.
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readers to answer a different but related question. In other words, our partic-
ipants – in their minds – substituted a question about truth with a question
about a related concept, for example, truthfulness or truth-for-ness. This
phenomenon is known in the psychological literature as ‘substitution heuris-
tic’. Such substitutions often happen, when the substituted question is easier
to answer than the original question. Applied to the case in Study 1, evalu-
ating whether Robert’s and Maria’s answers were true is relatively difficult,
because Robert and Maria had reliable information that turned out to be
misrepresenting reality. Thus, a question that is easier to answer might have
been substituted by the participants in our studies. We think that the substi-
tution objection can be cashed out in the following four ways.
According to the first version, when participants stated that Maria’s an-
swer was true, they wanted to convey that she was honest and not telling
any lies, or in other words, that she was truthful. As the concepts of truth
and truthfulness are quite strongly related, we consider this version of the ob-
jection to be particularly powerful. Second, instead of answering a question
about the truth of an answer, participants might have wanted to tell us that
the protagonist was permitted to give the answer in question, or, more tech-
nically, that the protagonist satisfied the norms for making an assertion. The
plausibility of this objection depends, of course, on what the norm of asser-
tion is. Some philosophers, for example, Douven (2006), Kneer (2018),
Marsili and Wiegmann (2021), and Reuter and Brössel (2018), argue (and
present empirical evidence) that the norm of assertion is justified belief. Con-
sequently, if participants follow such a norm and interpreted the question
about truth as a question about the norm of assertion, more answers in line
with the coherentist prediction are to be expected. Third, participants might
have substituted the question about the truth of Maria’s answer by a ques-
tion about Maria’s epistemic situation, specifically whether she had suffi-
cient epistemic reasons for believing that her answer was true. If that
happened, so the objection continues, the results of our study are not rele-
vant for the participant’s concept of truth, but rather for what they take to
be criteria of truth (see Rescher, 1973, for a discussion of this distinction).
According to the fourth and last proposal, when subjects selected the ‘true’
response, they did so, because they believed that the answer was true for
Maria, not that the answer was true in general.
Weagree that all versions of the substitutionobjection raise seriousworries
about the correct interpretation of our results. Also, note that every one of
the four alternative interpretations of the question would boost the amount
of answers that support the coherentist prediction. Given the significance
of the objection, we decided to tackle it empirically in three different ways.
First, to avoid the substitution heuristic, it is a common strategy in exper-
imental work to ask the putative replacement question before the original
question is asked. Thus, when we first ask participants whether the protago-
nist of the scenario answered the question to the best of her knowledge, it is
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unlikely that the participants will still substitute the subsequent truth ques-
tion with the same question they just answered. Asking participants whether
the protagonist answered the question to the best of her knowledge provides
the means to deal with the first three versions of the objection. A person who
answers a question to the best of her knowledge (a) is truthful, (b) satisfies
the justified belief norm of assertion, and (c) answers in line with the episte-
mic reasons available to her.
Second, to investigate whether people merely think that the answer was
true for Maria, we presented participants with the same vignette but then
asked participants whetherMaria’s answer was correct.Whereas the expres-
sion ‘true for someone’ is quite common, a similar phrase ‘correct for some-
one’ is not. The Corpus of Contemporary America English (COCA) lists the
phrase ‘true for you’ 171 times; for example, ‘True for you, but not for me’,
but only 10 hits for ‘correct for you’. Admittedly, the concept of correctness
does not quite match the concept of truth. We therefore need to be careful
not to put too much weight on the results of this condition.
Third, to investigate whether any of the four substitution heuristics took
place,wedidask theparticipants toexplain theiranswers. Ifmostparticipants
substitute the original question with a question about, for example, truthful-
ness or true-for-ness, this should be reflected in people’s responses. If, on the
otherhand,manyparticipants indeedentertainanotionof truth that isguided
by coherence, then people should explain their responses accordingly.
3.3.1. Methods
A total of 141 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Four participants had to be excluded for indicating that they were not native
English speakers. Of the remaining 137 participants, there were 65 women
(one indicating non-binary gender) with an average age of Mage = 34.83
(SD= 10.38). Given the difficulties of ascertaining incoherence that wemen-
tion in the discussion of Study 2, we decided to use the same vignettes as in
Study 1 and limited ourselves to the Rolex case; that is, participants received
the following vignette:
[Rolex] Maria is a watch collector. She keeps all her watches in a safe and knows her collection
really well. One day, her friend John asks her, whether she has a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her
safe and, if so, could show it to her. Maria answers that she has got a 1990 Rolex Submariner in
her safe. After all, she had purchased that watch a few years ago. When Maria opens the safe a
little later, she finds out that a burglar has stolen several watches, among them the 1990 Rolex
Submariner.
All participants were randomly assigned to three conditions. In the first
condition, participants received the Rolex vignette and directly answered
the truth question; that is,
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[Con1] Was Maria’s answer true or false?
Given the low responses to the ‘not sure’ response, we presented people
with only two options: (1) true and (2) false.
This condition also served as a partial replication of Study 1 and as a con-
trast condition for Conditions 2 and 3. After the question was answered, we
did prompt the participants to explain their response to the truth question. In
the second condition, participants were first asked a control question;
namely,
[Con2] Did Maria answer the question to the best of her knowledge?
People were presented with two options: (1) yes and (2) no.
After the control question, people were first given the truth question and
were then asked to explain their response.
In the third condition, people were asked to answer the following correct-
ness question:
[Con3] Was Maria’s answer correct?
We presented people with two options: (1) yes and (2) no. Again, people
were asked to explain their response.
3.3.2. Results and discussion
The results are displayed in Figure 3. In the first condition, in which no con-
trol question was asked before the truth question, 71.1% of the participants
chose the ‘true’ response in line with the coherentism hypothesis. In the
second condition, a question was placed beforehand as a control to prevent
a possible substitution. All participants passed the control question and
chose the ‘yes’ option in response. The percentage of true responses to the
truth question in Condition 2 was 51.1%. A Pearson’s χ2 test yielded a mar-
ginally significant difference between the two conditions: χ2 = 2.97,
p = 0.085. In the correctness condition, 44.7% of the participants selected
the ‘yes’ response. A Pearson’s χ2 test revealed a significant difference be-
tween the correctness condition and the original condition: χ2 = 4.12,
p = 0.032.
In Condition 1, six out of 31 participants who claimed thatMaria’s answer
was true used words like ‘lie’, ‘deception’, or ‘truthfulness’ in their explana-
tions. It is indeed likely that these participants substituted the truth question
with a question about truthfulness. In Condition 2 (with control question be-
forehand), 22 participants chose the ‘true’ response. Of these 22 participants,
four people gave explanations that indicate that they considered the question
to be about truthfulness.
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In all three conditions, a substantial number of participants (Condition 1:
14 participants; Condition 2: 8 participants; and Condition 3: 12 partici-
pants) provided explanations that indicate the importance of coherence with
the available set of beliefs. Some of the explanations that were given by par-
ticipants were ‘It was true based on the information she had at the time’,
‘Maria was telling the truth based upon the information she knew at the
time’, ‘It is true based upon the reports’, ‘Maria answered based on knowl-
edge she knew to be true’, ‘Maria gave an answer based on information they
believed to be true at the time’, ‘To the best of their knowledge these answers
were true’, ‘She told the truth based on what she knew at the time’, and ‘Ac-
cording to her knowledge, the answer was true’.
When a control question was placed before the test question, a substantial
number of participants, 51.1%, considered Maria’s answer to be true. The
drop in the true responses are only marginally significant, but a 20% differ-
ence indicates that there might well be an effect of the control question on
people’s responses to the truth question. A similar case might be made in re-
gard to the correctness results. There was a significant drop of coherentist re-
sponses when the ‘true’ question was substituted with a ‘correct’ question.
Nonetheless, and importantly, the results of testing the truthfulness and
true-for-ness objection have not undermined the main outcome of Studies
1 and 2. Both hypotheses, that is, correspondentism and coherentism, do
not find empirical support from our studies.
Figure 3. Responses in % for the three conditions in Study 3.
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3.4. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL DATA
All in all, our studies show four important points about the everyday use of
‘true’ within the empirical domain.
First, there is substantial variation in the use of ‘true’. No uniform answers
were given to the question ‘Was Robert’s/Maria’s answer true?’ Instead,
participants largely disagree on whether Robert’s/Maria’s answer was true
or false. Overall, we tested participants’ views in eight different conditions.
This variation is a challenge for both monistic and scope pluralistic theories
of truth, which both predict little variation in the answers to our cases. In
contrast, the variation we found indicates that ‘true’ is ambiguous since
the responses were in fact divided between answers in line with coherentist
predictions and answers in line with correspondentist predictions.
Second, vagueness is hardly an issue. The relatively small number of ‘not
sure’ answers suggests that the vignettes did not present borderline cases. Of
course, this interpretation can only be applied to questions of vagueness re-
garding the cases we studied. For a general assessment of the vagueness of
truth, much more extensive studies would be needed.
Third, conflating the question about truth with a question about truthful-
ness or about the norms of assertion is a plausible explanation for some of
the answers, but it cannot explain the entire variance we found. Instead,
we now have even stronger reasons to be confident that the term ‘true’ is in-
deed ambiguous. Even when a possibly substituted question was asked be-
fore the actual test question, over 50% of the participants gave answers
that are best interpreted in accordance with the coherentist picture.
Finally, it is implausible that people are simply muddled in their use of
‘true’. The explanations they give for their answers rather suggest that they
gave their answers based on a clear understanding of the question.
What can we learn from these findings? The results seem to challenge both
monism and some versions of pluralism about truth. Exploring the conse-
quences of these findings for those accounts requires an in-depth discussion
we cannot undertake here. In what follows, we will focus on another per-
spective: In which ways do our findings motivate re-engineering truth?
4. The Project of Re-engineering Truth
Our experiments exemplify a specific way how empirical research can con-
tribute to projects of conceptual re-engineering: it can be used to test key as-
sumptions of available or newly undertaken re-engineering work.9 Not only
Tarski’s classical explication of truth (Tarski, 1933) but also most attempts
at giving an exact account of truth rely on the assumption that there is a uni-
form use of ‘true’ in everyday language, at least in the empirical domain.10
Our experiments strongly challenge this assumption and show that research
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on coherence may actually be much more relevant to explicating the every-
day concept of truth than previously thought. Hence, there is reason to reex-
amine existing theoretical work on truth and especially to reconsider the
potential use and range of application of exact accounts of truth. In
Section 4.1, we discuss different ways in which truth may be re-engineered
before we turn to questions of implementation in Section 4.2.
4.1. GOALS AND STRATEGIES FOR RE-ENGINEERING TRUTH
The main finding of our experiments is the substantial variance in the every-
day use of ‘true’, which indicates that ‘true’ is ambiguous between a
correspondentist and a coherentist reading.11 Our results also show that
the variance is not an effect of the alleged vagueness of ‘true’. Nor can it
be explained away by the conjecture that respondents failed to distinguish
truth from truthfulness and true for. All in all, we have good reason to take
serious the differences we found in the use of ‘true’.
Our findings also imply that the potential problems sparked by different
uses of ‘true’ – ranging from misunderstandings to deliberate deceptions –
cannot successfully be dealt with straightforwardly by more fact checking
alone, because we also need to ask in which sense ‘true’ is used. Given the
fundamental importance of truth in science, political discourse, legal dis-
course, everyday exchanges, philosophy, and so on,12 the ambiguity of ‘true’
rather makes truth a target for conceptual re-engineering. Of course, we need
to be careful not to overgeneralize our results from three studies (and two
different types of scenarios) to the empirical domain more generally. How-
ever, the relatively high robustness of the results and the intuitively high rep-
resentativeness of the cases make it likely, albeit not guaranteed, that the
issue applies widely to everyday and political discourse.
That we advocate taking everyday language serious does not imply that
we think the current use of ‘true’ should be left untouched or that a project
of conceptual re-engineering should give priority to capturing everyday lan-
guage as faithfully as possible. Rather, we want to underline that without
knowing what is going on in everyday language we do not really know what
conceptual re-engineering has to offer and in which ways it can be used to
improve upon current everyday language use. Once we realize that ‘true’ is
used in both a correspondentist and a coherentist sense, we see that it will
not do to confine attention to just one type of use and simply ignore all other
uses.
Here are three more promising strategies:
1 The monistic strategy opts for one target concept (either
correspondentist or coherentist) which is supposed to be adopted for
some uses of ‘true’, whereas all other uses are not simply ignored
but deemed incorrect and actively discouraged.
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2 The multidimensional strategy introduces a single multidimensional
target concept with a correspondence and a coherence dimension.
3 The two concepts strategy advocates for two target concepts, one
correspondentist and one coherentist.
The choice of an adequate re-engineering strategy needs to be guided by the
goals of the re-engineering project and its intended domain of application.
The project we are focusing on aims at addressing truth in public discourse
and everyday contexts, and it is motivated by concerns that fit with what
one may call an ‘agenda of enlightenment’. In particular, we are interested
in tools that could help to improve discourse and reasoning. On a most gen-
eral level, by re-engineering truth, we hope to reduce sources of misunder-
standing and confusion. More specifically, we may also aspire to foster
(self-)critique of false and muddled appeals to, for example, ‘truth’ based
on ‘alternative facts’ or an era of ‘post-truth’ or ‘post-fact’.
These purposes have consequences for the re-engineering project. First,
target concepts should not primarily be judged by the criterion of similarity
to the actual use of ‘true’. Second, the re-engineering project should not take
the form of an entirely theory driven explication relying on an overly techni-
cal or formal background, but seek target concepts and expressions that
could actually find their way into everyday language use.
On this basis, we argue that Strategy (3) is preferable to the alternatives.
At first sight, however, introducing more than one target concept for truth
may seem implausible and far-fetched. Is not Strategy (1) muchmore attrac-
tive?After all, it seems to underlie themost prominent view in the philosoph-
ical tradition, which focuses on the use of ‘true’ that can be explicated in the
correspondentist fashion. Moreover, Strategy (1) also includes rejecting
other uses of ‘true’ as incorrect. This makes it a highly revisionist strategy
with respect to the usage of ‘true’ documented in our experiments. As reac-
tions to presentations of our studies have shown, this revisionist element is
attractive to many philosophers. It seems that those surprised or shocked
by our results tend to think that non-correspondentist uses of ‘true’ in every-
day language should just be rejected as incorrect. But although going for a
revisionist approach is not problematic in itself, there is little reason for crit-
icizing considerations of coherence as such. Denying that coherence is a le-
gitimate and relevant point is just implausible, independent of whether one
thinks that coherence should not be associated with the word ‘true’ or that
we do not have a satisfactory explication of coherence. This, however, means
that coherentist and correspondentist uses of ‘true’ are important and should
be targets of conceptual re-engineering – especially if one thinks that
coherentist uses of ‘true’ should be eliminated.13
For those who think that introducing two target concepts will threaten the
unity of truth in a problematic way, re-engineering truth as a
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multidimensional concept (Strategy 2) may seem to provide an elegant op-
tion. Instead of selectively disfavoring one use of ‘true’ (as in Strategy 1),
we could insist on there being just one concept of truth but nonetheless ac-
cept correspondence and coherence as genuine aspects of truth. This would
be a notable advantage if we thought that we should be able to handle situ-
ations in which correspondence and coherence diverge by an overall judge-
ment of truth which combines consideration of both aspects. However, a
multidimensional concept would confront us with the question of what to
say about the considerations that determine the weighing needed for arriving
at an overall judgement. It is far from clear that any fairly determinate an-
swer can be made plausible. But most importantly, the very possibility of
amalgamating considerations of correspondence and coherence in an overall
judgement of truth seems not desirable at all, given our goal of reducing
sources of misunderstanding and confusion.
Strategy (3) avoids these problems and provides an appropriate and ele-
gant way of addressing the finding that in everyday discourse correspon-
dence with facts and coherence are both important and both covered by
the concept of truth as reflected in the use of the word ‘true’. Since both cor-
respondence and coherence are perfectly legitimate concerns, an engineering
project had better not privilege the correspondentist at the expense of the
coherentist use of ‘true’, or the other way around. Clarity should rather be
gained by explicitly distinguishing correspondentist and coherentist uses.
This speaks in favor of introducing specifically correspondentist and
coherentist concepts, in line with Tarski’s (1944, pp. 355–356) advice. The
good news is, of course, that philosophers have already done a great deal
of work by distinguishing correspondence from coherence and other related
concepts such as justification and confirmation. Applying these distinctions
to everyday discourse and reasoning should therefore be helpful to draw at-
tention to different criteria of truth: empirical evidence which verifies or fal-
sifies a statement by showing that it does (not) correspond with the facts in
the case of correspondence and support by basic commitments and back-
ground assumptions in the case of coherence.
4.2. IMPLEMENTING TWO TARGET CONCEPTS
How could such a re-engineering project be implemented?What is probably
most important to note first is that the philosopher’s concepts of correspon-
dence and coherence are both target concepts for truth as it is manifest in the
use of ‘true’ in everyday language. If our analysis is correct, it would be a
mistake to think, as proponents of the monistic strategy typically do, that
correspondence with facts/reality (or some more technical explication
thereof) is the single most appropriate target concept that could serve as a
more clearly delineated replacement for truth in everyday discourse.
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So the first point a conceptual re-engineer of the everyday concept of truth
should insist on is just that we need to promote the distinction between cor-
respondence and coherence. If ‘true’ is used in an everyday context, the
resulting utterance may well be in need of disambiguation. It is therefore al-
ways a good idea to ask yourself or the speaker whether it is correspondence
with facts she has in mind or rather coherence with some set of statements –
especially so if there is a suspicion that the two considerations may actually
pull in different directions.
The second point concerns terminology. The analysis we defend also
speaks against using ‘true’ for one of the target concepts. This point might
be met with skepticism. Is discouraging or even eliminating the use of ‘true’
in everyday language not quite an unrealistic proposal? And, surely, intro-
ducing technical terms like truecoh into everyday language is a silly idea, isn’t
it? Nonetheless, we think that it is often worthwhile to avoid the word ‘true’
and its cognates and look instead for expressions that are available as means
of clarification. So we should, for example, ask questions such as ‘Is it a fact
thatFrance is in turmoil because of the Paris accord? Or is it a claim that fits
withTrump’s beliefs?’And confronted with the Rolex case, it would be help-
ful to say something like ‘Maria’s answer was coherent with what she knew,
but the fact is that the 1990 Rolex Submariner was not in her safe.’
Both points might seem rather dull insofar as the general advice to avoid
ambiguous expression where they could lead to confusion seems rather un-
controversial. But the application of this advice to the use of ‘true’ in every-
day discourse is not uncontroversial at all. It is neither available to
philosophers who advocate the monistic strategy nor to people who think
that more fact checking alone will cure those who call claims not in line with
facts ‘true’.
Moreover, the potential for clarification does not stop at pointing out am-
biguous uses of ‘true’. Careful conceptual work has more to offer than the
mere distinction between the concepts correspondence and coherence. Best
known, of course, is the extensive work which has been done on developing
concepts of truth that avoid Liar and Revenge paradoxes. But for the project
we are promoting here, these problems are not crucial. Rather, some very el-
ementary issues a conceptual re-engineer needs to address offer considerable
potential for clarification of everyday discourse14: For example: How many
argument places should the target concept have?What should be its range of
meaningful application? Should it be a classificatory or a comparative con-
cept? Used in the sense of correspondence, ‘true’ may be constructed as a
classificatory one-place predicate intended to be applied to sentences, beliefs,
statements, utterances, and the like. The concept of coherence, however, has
a different structure (which probably varies from context to context, but we
ignore this complication here). We need at least a two-place predicate that
expresses a relation between an individual sentence (or belief or . . .) and a
specific set of sentences (or a set of beliefs or . . .), and this relation admits
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of degrees. So whereas in the correspondentist reading ‘Maria’s answer is
true’ can be re-engineered as ‘Maria’s answer corresponds with the facts’, in
the coherentist reading, it is elliptical for something like ‘Maria’s answer co-
heres perfectly with the beliefs she held at the time of giving the answer.’ All
this, we submit, has a critical potential, which has not been exploited enough
for clarifying uses of ‘true’ so far.
Finally, we need to keep in mind that it makes little sense to design
projects of conceptual engineering as addressing one specific concept
only. As soon as we start re-engineering truth in terms of correspondence
or coherence, further concepts such as fact, belief, and correspond come
into focus and potentially become targets for conceptual re-engineering.
All the points just mentioned are familiar from the many projects that
have aimed at explicating truth or coherence. We emphasize them here,
because they all have great potential to contribute to the clarification
of everyday use of ‘true’ – a fact that is lost on those who simply assume
that in empirical matters the everyday concept of truth just boils down to
correspondence.
5. Conclusion
Empirical research can be used to test and challenge (or even refute) relevant
assumptions about the actual use of a concept. In everyday language, the use
of ‘true’ shows substantial variance within the empirical domain indicating
that ‘true’ is ambiguous: in several scenarios, some subjects used ‘true’ in line
with correspondentist, others in line with coherentist predictions. Given the
results of our studies, we suggested to re-engineer the concept of truth. More
specifically, we argued that in order to improve public discourse and reason-
ing, we need at least two target concepts, one capturing truth in the
correspondentist sense and one covering coherence. Because truth theorists
so far have focused on debating explications at the expense of careful and
empirically informed studies of the concepts actually used, they have consid-
erably underestimated how much systematic critical potential of clarifica-
tion their work has.
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‘Post-truth’ was selected as Word of the Year 2016 by Oxford dictionaries; see https://
languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 (accessed 20-08-2020).
2 Onemight think that it is more plausible that ‘true’ exhibits some form of polysemy rather
than ambiguity (see Lanius, 2019, for this distinction). Since the difference between ambiguity
and polysemy plays no role for our purpose, we simply speak of ambiguity throughout.
3 A note on terminology: we use ‘conceptual engineering’ to refer to the explicit and inten-
tional development of a concept in order to solve some theoretical or practical problem and ‘con-
ceptual re-engineering’ for conceptual engineering that is guided by a concept in use and
simultaneously aims at replacing this concept.
4 For a thoroughgoing defense of truth pluralism based on several empirical studies on the
folk concept of truth, see Ulatowski (2017).
5 In that sense, our philosophical project is also an invitation for those skeptical of our hy-
potheses to suggest ways of operationalizing their notion of truth for empirical studies.
6 We did not opt for measuring people’s responses with a Likert scale, because graded re-
sponse options would arguably bias people into thinking more in a coherentist way.
Correspondentists usually consider truth to be binary; that is, Maria’s and Robert’s answers
are either true or false, but not something in between.
7 We would like to thank a reviewer for this journal for pressing us on this point.
8 Scenarios that pitch correspondence against incoherence are more difficult to design than
vice versa. Especially the reliance on memory is problematic because it is not clear whether a
statement that is incoherent with a forgotten piece of information yields the right kind of inco-
herence that is needed. Thus, some people might have selected ‘true’ despite holding a
coherentist conception of truth, because they believed Robert’s or Maria’s answer to be coher-
ent. Another way to realize the incoherence of an answer with a certain set of beliefs would be
to use cases of dishonesty. However, such cases might bias people into interpreting the question
to be about truthfulness instead of truth (see also Section 3.3).
9 For discussions of other contributions of empirical research to conceptual re-engineering,
see Shepherd and Justus (2015), Machery (2017, ch. 7), Pinder (2017), and Koch (2019).
10
‘Explication’ in Carnap’s (1962) sense is a method of conceptual re-engineering which
seeks exact and fruitful concepts for some theoretical purpose (see Brun, 2016). Hence, most
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theories of truth which aim at giving an exact account of truth can be seen as proposing explica-
tions of truth and therefore as projects of conceptual re-engineering.
11 As in our empirical studies, we simplify by focusing on correspondentist and coherentist
readings of ‘true’ although it is quite possible that additional uses may be important in everyday
language.
12 This is not to say that science aims at relying on true statements only (think of idealiza-
tions), similarly for other discourses.
13 Note that our objection specifically targets the application of Strategy (1) to the project we
sketched in the preceding paragraphs. In another setting, focusing exclusively on
correspondentist or on coherentist uses of ‘true’ may be an adequate strategy.
14 Brun (2016) contains a more comprehensive list of questions explicators have to address.
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